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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been popular discussion in the workplace recently
about the "rights" of nonsmokers to a "smoke-free" working envi-
ronment and the "rights" of smokers to smoke.' This is true even
though state and federal courts have been quite hostile to the
claims of nonsmokers and recently smokers alike, seeking legal
rights for their respective positions.2 A decade of litigation in this
area has now made it clear that the courts are reluctant to accord
legal rights to either side, except in certain narrow circumstances.'
It is increasingly clear that resolution of the workplace smok-
ing issue has now moved beyond the judicial branch of govern-
1. Approximately eighty-eight percent (88%) of all employers in the United
States permit smoking in the workplace. Only approximately twelve percent
(12%) of the employers in the United States ban smoking on the job. BNA,
Where There's Smoke: Problems and Policies Concerning Smoking in the Work-
place, A Special Report, Table 2 at page 20 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter BNA, Spe-
cial Report]. Moreover, approximately one-half of all employers have written poli-
cies addressing smoking in the workplace. Id. at 18.
2. Part of the hesitancy of the courts to embrace smoking in the workplace
issues may flow from the large numbers of potentially active litigants. According
to the most recent (1987) government statistics compiled by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control, over one-fourth (26.5%) of adult Americans smoke. BNA, Special
Report, at 12.
3. This Article does not address the health or product liability litigation is-
sues concerning tobacco use. For a discussion of the scientific evidence relating to
environmental tobacco smoke, see generally National Academy of Sciences, En-
vironmental Tobacco Smoke: Measuring Exposures and Assessing Health Effects
(1986) [hereinafter NAS Report]; Surgeon General's Report on Environmental
Tobacco Smoke-The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking (1986)
[hereinafter Surgeon General's Report]; 38 World Health Organization, Interna-
tional Agency for Research on Cancer, IARC Monograph on the Evaluation of
the Carcinogenic Risk of Chemicals to Humans: Tobacco Smoking 308 (1986)
[hereinafter IARC Monograph]; and Proceedings of Indoor and Ambient Air
Quality Conference, Imperial College (London, England, June 13-15, 1988 [here-
inafter Proceedings].
See also Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco Indus-
try: Toward a Smoke-Free Society? 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1987); and Crist &
Majoras, The "New" Wave In Smoking and Health Litigation-Is Anything Re-
ally So New? 54 TENN. L. REV. 551 (1987).
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ment 4 Despairing of winning legal rights in the courts, anti-smok-
ing advocates have moved the smoking issue into the second
branch of government-the legislature. While there are currently
thirteen (13) state statutes and approximately five hundred local
ordinances that address smoking in the workplace, the vast major-
ity of smoking legislation routinely fails to be enacted.
There is also recent evidence that the workplace smoking con-
troversy is now leaving the legislative arena and heading to the
third branch of government-the executive.' Whatever the even-
tual fate of the issue there, it is now clear that neither judicial ac-
tion, legislative enactment, or executive branch intervention will
effectively resolve the competing interests of nonsmokers and
smokers in the workplace.
Rather, most employers have learned from experience that the
workplace smoking issue requires nonsmoking and smoking em-
ployees, unions, ventilation experts, and management all to come
together to resolve the complex interweave of perceived "rights,"
tolerance, accommodation, and technical/mechanical indoor air
quality issues. The most effective resolutions appear to be those
based on interdisciplinary considerations from the legal, human re-
sources, and mechanical engineering departments of corporate em-
ployers. It is too simplistic in the late 1980's for companies to ei-
ther ignore the issue entirely, rely on a generic corporate policy, or
legislation created externally to the workplace to resolve this com-
plex competition of social habits and preferences.
This Article will examine the legal issues that surround the
workplace smoking controversy and will discuss the "rights" of
smokers and nonsmokers. This Article also reviews legislation
aimed at protecting the interests of smokers and nonsmokers in
connection with their employment. Finally, the Article discusses
practical resolutions which employers may find useful when ad-
dressing workplace smoking issues.
Generally speaking, the case law reveals that workplace smok-
ing controversy has not accorded legal "rights" to either smokers
or nonsmokers, except in very limited circumstances. Although
4. Indeed, less than a handful of lawsuits concerning workplace smoking have
been filed in the last several years.
5. For example, after twelve successive years of rejection of public smoking
legislation in New York State, in 1987, Governor Cuomo directed the New York
Public Health Council to issue public smoking regulations. New York's highest
court subsequently struck down these regulations as violative of state law.
Boreali, v. Axelrod, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (1987).
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more significant developments have occurred on the legislative
front, few "rights" have been conferred to employees-smoking or
nonsmoking-by recently enacted laws. In addition, only a small
number of administrative regulations in this area have surfaced. As
with their legislative counterparts, it is unlikely that administra-
tive regulations can effectively address smoking issues across-the-
board in private workplaces.
Companies in the United States have managed the smoking
issue by undertaking to accommodate in a fair and reasonable
manner the competing interests of nonsmokers and smokers alike.
In doing so, the American corporate community has staved off, for
the most part, the need for judicial, legislative, or executive inter-
vention in the workplace smoking issue.
II. MOST EMPLOYEES HAVE No JUDICIALLY PROTECTED "RIGHTS"
REGARDING WORKPLACE SMOKING
Both nonsmoking and smoking employees have found that the
courts are generally unwilling to intervene in the workplace smok-
ing controversy. Indeed, the courts have been quite hostile to the
claims of nonsmokers seeking a legal "right" to a smoke-free work
environment. That same conclusion is also emerging in the recent
wave of smokers' "rights" cases. The consensus of the courts ap-
pears to be that, absent any legislative limitation on management's
discretion, employers need to accommodate the competing inter-
ests of both smoking and nonsmoking employees.
Beginning in 1976, nonsmokers filed the first of a series of
"test cases" seeking the legal right to a smoke-free work environ-
ment.' With a few limited exceptions, the courts have been hostile
to the claims of healthy nonsmokers seeking a legal right to a
smoke-free work environment. Instead, the general response of the
courts has been that this is an issue best left to management dis-
cretion or the legislative process.'
6. See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone, 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1976).
7. See, e.g., Federal Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446
F. Supp. 181, 185 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 926 (1979); Gaspar v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District, 418 F. Supp.
716, 722 (E.D. La. 1976); McCarthy v. Social and Health Services, 110 Wash. 2d
812, 826, 759 P.2d 351 (1988).
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A. Constitutional Claims
The courts have summarily rejected the notion that employees
or members of the public have a constitutional right to an environ-
ment free of tobacco smoke.8 In the leading decision, Gasper v.
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District,' a group of non-
smokers sought to prohibit smoking during sports and other public
events at the Louisiana Superdome. The plaintiffs claimed that
their exposure to tobacco smoke in the Superdome infringed their
constitutional rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.10 Specif-
ically, the plaintiffs in Gasper alleged that exposure to tobacco
smoke at the Superdome infringed upon their first amendment
right to receive ideas; deprived them of life, liberty, and property
without due process in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments; and breached their fundamental privacy rights guaranteed
by the ninth amendment." The court rejected each of the plain-
tiffs' constitutional arguments and stated that to hold that the
Constitution prohibits smoking would be to create an unprece-
dented avenue "through which an individual could attempt to reg-
ulate the social habits of his neighbor."12
Likewise in Kensell v. State of Oklahoma,"3 a public em-
ployee's constitutional challenge to workplace smoking was also re-
jected. In this case, the employee claimed that his employer, the
State of Oklahoma, violated his rights guaranteed by the first,
fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments." Namely, the employee
alleged that by allowing smoking in the workplace, the state inter-
fered with his "right to think" and committed assault against his
person. 5 The court rejected both of these arguments and unequiv-
ocally held that "the United States Constitution does not empower
the federal judiciary . . . to impose no-smoking rules in the plain-
8. Of course, the United States Constitution generally limits only public em-
ployers' action (state and federal) and, for the most part, does not limit action by
private employers. See Rotunda, Nowak & Nelson, Treatise on Constitutional
Law: Substance and Procedure, § 16.1, (1986).
9. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
10. Id. at 717.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 721.
13. 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1351.
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tiff's workplace."' In sum, every reported decision addressing the
issue has concluded that employees have no constitutionally pro-
tected right to a smoke-free work environment.17
Similarly, the corollary to the nonsmokers' challenge, in other
words, the smoker's asserted constitutional "right" to smoke, has
also been rejected. In Rossie v. State of Wisconsin Department of
Revenue,' the state intermediate appellate court upheld a Wiscon-
sin statute prohibiting smoking in all but certain designated areas
of a state-controlled building. 9 Rossie, an eighteen-year employee
and pipe smoker, challenged the statute, claiming that he could
not lawfully be disciplined for smoking at work.'0 He alleged that
the law violated his and his fellow smokers' constitutional right to
equal protection of the laws." The court rejected this argument on
the ground that the state had a "reasonable basis" for prohibiting
smoking in certain designated areas and thus, it did not violate the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause."
A prohibition against off-duty smoking, a restriction thus far
imposed almost uniquely upon police, fire, and other public safety
officers, has also withstood limited constitutional challenge.' 3 In
16. Id.
17. See also Federal Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446
F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
926 (1979) (smoking in federal buildings does not violate Constitution); GASP v.
Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979) (smoking in county
buildings and facilities not unconstitutional).
18. 133 Wis. 2d 341, 395 N.W.2d 801 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 401
N.W.2d 10 (Wis. 1987).
19. Id.
20. Id. at , 395 N.W.2d at 804.
21. Id.
22. Id. at , 395 N.W.2d at 807.
23. Fire fighters in many states are protected by "heart and lung" statutes
which create a presumption that any cardiovascular or respiratory conditions suf-
fered are work-related. These statutes are often used to justify off-duty smoking
bans. See generally Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health
or Bad Public Policy?, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 940, 952-953 (1987).
Most smoking bans have been promulgated at the local level. Approximately
thirty-two localities currently discriminate against smokers when hiring fire fight-
ers, police officers, and other public safety employees. Massachusetts is currently
the only state to ban smoking by newly hired recruits. However, unions have
vowed to challenge this legislation as unconstitutional. See Police Union Plans
Challenge of Smoking Ban, Boston Globe October 7, 1988 Metro section, at 33.
The most stringent hiring policies call for refusal to hire smokers, require
signatures of agreement not to smoke, call for possible termination upon violation
and have, in some instances, been written into collective bargaining agreements.
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6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss3/1
SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
Grusendorf v. Oklahoma City,2 the court upheld a fire depart-
ment's ban on off-duty smoking applicable to fire fighter trainees.
The Grusendorf Court found that the smoking ban infringed upon
constitutionally protected liberty and privacy rights:
It can hardly be disputed that the Oklahoma City Fire Depart-
ment's nonsmoking regulation infringes upon the liberty and pri-
vacy of fire fighter trainees. The regulation reaches well beyond
the workplace and well beyond the hours for which they receive
pay. It burdens them after their shift has ended, restricts them on
weekends and vacations, in their automobiles and backyards and
even, with the doors closed and the shades drawn, in the private
sanctuary of their own homes."
Despite this finding, the Grusendorf Court upheld the smoking
ban because, under the circumstances, the city satisfied its burden
of proving that the ban bore a rational relationship to the promo-
tion of the health and safety of the fire fighters."
Despite the outcome of Grusendorf, employer restrictions
against off-duty behavior give rise to serious privacy concerns and
are likely to be challenged in the future.2 7 Moreover, where the
smoking restrictions apply to only part of the work force, such as
new hires, they are likely to be challenged on equal protection
grounds. Indeed, any smoking restriction that applies to only some
members of a work force would appear irrational on its face. In
Grusendorf, the court specifically questioned whether the smoking
ban, which applied only to fire fighter trainees, could withstand an
attack on equal protection grounds. The court stated:
The one peculiar aspect of the nonsmoking regulation that does
not appear entirely rational is that it is limited in its application
to first year fire fighter trainees only. The rest of the fire fighters,
for whom good health and physical conditioning are no doubt also
important, are apparently free, as far as the Oklahoma City Fire
Department is concerned, to smoke all the cigarettes they
Several localities have expressed a general preference for nonsmoking employees
if a choice must be made between a smoker and a nonsmoker. At least one juris-
diction requires mandatory attendance at "health seminars," which include com-
pulsory exercise and nonsmoking educational programs.
24. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
25. Id. at 541.
26. Id. at 544.
27. See The Company Is Watching You Everywhere, The New York Times,
February 15, 1987, section 4, p. 21; When Can You Fire for Off-duty Conduct?
Harvard Business Review, January-February 1988.
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desire.2
The court refused, however, to consider this issue since it was not
raised by the parties.
B. Statutory Claims
Employees have relied upon numerous statutes in their at-
tempts to limit smoking in the workplace or alternatively, to ob-
tain financial benefits. These statutory bases include federal and
state handicap laws, disability statutes, and workers' compensation
laws.2 9 On the other hand, union employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement have successfully relied upon federal labor
laws to protect their "right" to smoke. In addition, minority em-
ployees may, under some circumstances, allege that smoking re-
strictions unfairly affect them in violation of state or federal dis-
crimination laws. These various statutory claims are discussed
below.
1. Handicap, Workers' Compensation and Disability Claims
Courts have generally refused to restrict workplace smoking,
regardless of the legal theory invoked by a employee. Some courts,
however, have found that certain employees claiming severe ad-
verse reactions to tobacco smoke are "handicapped" or "disabled"
or may be able to recover workers' compensation benefits.
In Vickers v. Veterans Administration," the court found that
an employee was "handicapped" within the meaning of section 504
28. 816 F.2d at 543.
29. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651, et
seq., currently provides no remedy for nonsmokers seeking a smoke-free work en-
vironment. Tobacco smoke is not listed by OSHA as a "toxic and hazardous sub-
stance." See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, et seq. Indeed, in 1987, OSHA denied a citizen
petition requesting OSHA to classify tobacco smoke as a potential occupational
carcinogen and develop a standard for "tobacco smoke." Bureau of National Af-
fairs, Daily Report for Executives, March 2, 1987, p. A-24, DER No. 39. In addi-
tion, OSHA administrators have consistently refused to accept complaints based
solely on work place smoking and thus, apparently do not perceive that environ-
mental tobacco smoke constitutes a violation of an employer's statutory duty to
provide a "healthful" working environment. Moreover, OSHA provides no private
right of action for employees who seek to restrict work place smoking. See Federal
Employees for Nonsmokers Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C.
1978) aff'd, 598 F.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); Barrera v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours, 653 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D.Wash. 1982).
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of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 197381 when it found him to
be "hypersensitive '3 2 to tobacco smoke and physically unable to
perform his job in the presence of environmental tobacco smoke.3
In GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 4 however, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals rejected similar claims, cautioning that the term
"handicap" was not intended to include all persons who claim to
suffer a pulmonary problem, however minor, or those who experi-
ence discomfort in the presence of tobacco smoke.3 5
In the workers' compensation context, a California court has
held that a nurse who left her job because of claimed "allergic"
reactions to tobacco smoke was eligible for unemployment compen-
sation until she could find alternative employment in a smoke-free
environment. 6 A Louisiana court has denied unemployment bene-
fits under similar circumstances because it found that the em-
31. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1978), et seq. The Rehabilitation Act generally imposes
nondiscrimination obligations (and in some cases affirmative action requirements)
upon a limited group of employers: i.e., federal agencies, federal contractors, and
recipients of federal assistance.
32. The Vickers Court used the terms "hypersensitivity" and "unusually sen-
sitive" interchangeably. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 87. In medical terms, "hypersen-
sitivity" is defined as "a state of altered reactivity in which the body reacts with
an exaggerated response to a foreign agent." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dic-
tionary p. 635 (26th ed. 1981).
This term must not be confused with "allergy" or "allergic reaction." To
date, no specific antigens have been identified in tobacco smoke, and when indi-
viduals claim to be "allergic" to smoke, at best, they can be said to suffer from
non-specific responses to smoke exposure. See Lehrer, et al., Tobacco Smoke Sen-
sitivity: A Result of Allergy? Annals of Allergy, 56 May 1986, at 1-10.
33. The Vickers court did not award any injunctive or monetary relief, how-
ever, because it found that: First, the employer did not discriminate against plain-
tiff by reason of his handicap; and second, the employer made reasonable efforts
to accommodate plaintiff. 549 F. Supp. at 87-89. For a thorough analysis of the
Vickers decision, see Limited Relief for Federal Employees Hypersensitive to
Tobacco Smoke: Federal Employer's Who'd Rather Fight May Have to Switch,
59 Wash. L. Rev. 305 (1984). See also Department of Fair Employment and
Housing v. Fresno County, FEHC Dec. No. 81-82 (C8-0009 ph) (1984) (employee
"extraordinarily sensitive" to tobacco smoke found to be "handicapped" under
California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
34. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
35. Id. at 227, 256 S.E.2d at 479. (emphasis added)
36. Alexander v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 104
Cal. App.3d 97, 163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980). See also McCrocklin v. Employment
Development Department, 156 Cal. App.3d 1067, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1984) (em-
ployee's good-faith fear that smoke-filled room was harmful to his health found
"reasonable" and employee entitled to unemployment benefits).
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ployee's preexisting allergy, which was not aggravated by her em-
ployment, did not constitute "good cause" for her resignation. 7
In Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Board,38 a federal em-
ployee who claimed to be hypersensitive to tobacco smoke was
found to be "disabled." 9 Nevertheless, the Parodi Court found
that the employee would not be entitled to disability benefits if the
employer offered her a reasonable accommodation by transfer to a
comparable job in a smoke-free work area.40
While each case is based on its own set of facts, these cases
seem to indicate that currently only those found by the courts to
have the most severe reactions to tobacco smoke will be considered
"handicapped" or "disabled. '41 On the other hand, an employee
who is merely "annoyed" is not typically found by the courts to be
"medically hypersensitive." '42 Private employers, subject to state
handicapped statutes, or federal contractors, covered by section
503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, may accordingly also have a
duty to reasonably accommodate employees found to be hypersen-
sitive where such an accommodation would not pose an "undue
hardship" on the employer or the rest of its work force. Yet, as the
court recognized in Vickers, "the desires of those employees who
wish to smoke cannot be disregarded. '43
An employer's offer to transfer the "handicapped" individual
to a comparable position in a smoke-free work area would appear
to be sufficient accommodation. However, if an employee is found
by the court to be medically hypersensitive and unable to continue
working, he or she may be permitted to collect disability or work-
ers' compensation benefits. Despite this fact, employers have great
latitude to accommodate the competing interests of smoking and
nonsmoking employees because the foregoing cases do not impose
37. Billman v. Sumrall, 464 So.2d 382 (La.App. 1985). But see Lapham v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
103 Pa. Cmmw. 144, 519 A.2d 1101 (1987) (bronchitis sufferer entitled to collect
unemployment benefits where proffered physical relocation was deemed not a
"reasonable accommodation"); McCrocklin, supra note 36.
38. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982), as amended, 702 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1983).
39. Id. at 751.
40. For a thorough analysis of Parodi, see Limited Relief for Federal Em-
ployees Hypersensitive to Tobacco Smoke: Federal Employer's Who'd Rather
Fight May Have to Switch, 59 Wash. L. Rev. 305 (1984).
41. See, e.g., Vickers, supra 549 F. Supp. at 87.
42. See, e.g., GASP, supra 256 S.E.2d at 479; Gordon, supra 462 A.2d at 15.
43. 549 F. Supp. at 89.
44. See Parodi, supra 702 F.2d at 749-751.
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any obligation upon an employer to restrict workplace smoking.
2. Labor Relations Claims
Unionized employees may have a "right" to smoke on the job
protected by a collective bargaining agreement. 5
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 46 prohibits an em-
ployer from unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment without bargaining with the union representing the em-
ployees. Failure to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.47
Rules governing workplace smoking have been held to be
"terms and conditions of employment" and accordingly, are sub-
ject to mandatory collective bargaining.48 Thus, unless the collec-
tive bargaining agreement includes a broad "management rights"
clause49 permitting the employer unilaterally to establish plant
45. In 1986, the AFL-CIO issued a National Resolution opposing unilateral
attempts by management (and legislative mandates) to impose workplace smok-
ing restrictions. It provides, in part:
Unions are faced with legislation or unilaterally imposed employer poli-
cies that forbid smoking on the job and infringe on the rights of workers
who smoke. Unions have a legal responsibility to represent the interests
of all their members-smokers and nonsmokers. The AFL-CIO believes
that issues related to smoking on the job can best be worked out volunta-
rily in individual workplaces between labor and management in a man-
ner that protects the interests and rights of all workers and not by legis-
lative mandate.
See BNA, Special Report, Appendix D. There have also been scattered reports
that rules regarding smoking in the workplace have become issues in union or-
ganizing drives.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1982).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The National Labor Relations Board has broad
powers to prevent and/or remedy unfair labor practices. See generally 29 U.S.C. §
160.
48. See Chemtronics, Inc., 236 NLRB No. 21 (1978). See also Commonwealth
of Pa. v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., Pa. Commw. 1, 459 A.2d 452 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983) ("[tlhe subject of whether employees may smoke at their work
places appears to be at the center of those subjects properly described as 'condi-
tions of employment' "). See also Gallenkamp Stores v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th
Cir. 1968); S. S. Kresge v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1969); Wintergarden
Citrus Products v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Hilton
Mobile Homes, 387 F.2d 7, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1967).
49. An employer may insist upon a broad "management rights" clause. See
NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). In general, such
clauses give employers considerably more discretion over specific aspects of em-
ployment, which may include promotions, transfers, plant rules, etc. It is signifi-
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rules, the employer must first bargain with the union prior to re-
stricting smoking in the workplace.10 This is especially true in situ-
ations where smoking is a recognized right or privilege of
employment.
This issue was discussed in Re Parker Pen U.S.A.' In this
case, an employer, who had permitted on-the-job smoking for over
twenty years, unilaterally abolished employee smoking rights
which were guaranteed under the collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 The employer allegedly did so for health reasons after re-
ceiving the Surgeon General's 1986 report on involuntary smok-
ing. 3 In resolving an employee grievance, the arbitrator held that
"both parties have an interest in addressing the profound issue
raised by the employer concerning the safety of the work place. 61 4
Accordingly, the arbitrator invalidated the employer's smoking ban
until any changes could be bargained over during upcoming
negotiations.
Even where the employer is required to impose smoking re-
strictions pursuant to state statute or local ordinance, presumably
he must bargain over all discretionary aspects of the rule or else be
cant that the NLRB General Counsel has recently issued guidelines stating that
employers must bargain with their unions before instituting any drug-testing pol-
icy. See NLRB Memorandum GC 87-5 (Sept. 8, 1987). The General Counsel's
reasoning is so broad, it is not clear why "mandatory" bargaining would not also
be required of every other recognized term and condition of employment, includ-
ing smoking in the workplace.
50. To date, no court has found a management rights clause sufficiently
broad to permit the unilateral imposition of a smoking policy. In Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 74 Pa. Commw. 1, 459
A.2d 452 (1983) the court rejected, for example, an employer's argument that it
had the "inherent managerial" policy to unilaterally determine whether to permit
smoking at employee work stations. In the arbitration setting, compare Ohio
Dept. of Health 89 Lab.Arb. 937 (1987) (Cohen, Arb.); Morelite Equipment Co. 88
Lab.Arb 777 (1987) (Stoltenberg, Arb.); Snap-On Tools Corp. 87 Lab.Arb. 785
(1986) (Berman, Arb.); National Pen & Pencil Co. 87 Lab.Arb. 1081 (1986)
(Nicholas, Arb.); Litton Industries 75 Lab.Arb. 308 (1980) (Grabb, Arb.); Sher-
wood Medical Industries 72 Lab.Arb. 258 (1977) (Yarowsky, Arb.) (smoking re-
strictions upheld) with Dental Command, Dept. of the Army 83 Lab.Arb. 529
(1984) (Allen, Arb.); Union Sanitary District 79 Lab.Arb. 193 (1982) (Koven,
Arb.); Schien Body & Equipment Co., Inc. 69 Lab.Arb 930 (1977) (Roberts, Arb.)
(smoking restrictions invalid).
51. 90 Lab.Arb. 489 (1987) (Fleischli, Arb.).
52. Id. at 489-490.
53. See supra note 3.
54. 90 Lab.Arb. at 496.
55. Id.
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found guilty of an unfair labor practice.5 In practice, bargaining
will be routinely required because most workplace smoking laws
leave a considerable amount of discretion to employers."7
Even if the unilateral implementation of a smoking policy
does not violate the NLRA, it may nonetheless violate the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Arbitral decisions have consistently
stated that to be valid, an employer rule must be reasonable under
the circumstances and nondiscriminatory in application.5 s Arbitra-
tors have struck down employer smoking policies that fail to meet
this standard.
In Union Sanitary District,5 9 the arbitrator found that the
employer could not unilaterally prohibit employees from smoking
in their offices.60 Specifically, the arbitrator found that the abso-
lute prohibition was arbitrary because there was no adequate basis
for the rule.6" Although the employer stated it wanted to protect
nonsmoking employees, the evidence showed there were only two
bargaining unit members in the building who smoked; for six hours
56. There are no "smoking policy" cases directly addressing this point. How-
ever, the institution of a smoking policy would constitute a "term and condition"
of employment and, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. See supra note
41, and accompanying text. Nevertheless, neither union nor management may re-
quire the other to agree to provisions which are unlawful or prohibited. Meat Cut-
ters Local 421, 81 NLRB 1052 (1949); Borg-Warner v. NLRB, 356 U.S. 342
(1958). Thus, proposed or existing provisions that directly conflict with legislation
automatically become illegal or unenforceable. Hughes Tool Co., 147 NLRB 1573
(1964); Savannah Printing Specialties & Paper Products Local 604 v. Union Camp
Co., 50 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga 1972). Legislation that provides employers with
discretion, however, such as that which simply requires employers to "adopt" a
smoking policy, would not be affected. That is, the particular discretionary as-
pects of the policy would still be a mandatory subject of bargaining.
57. For example, the New Hampshire law cited at infra note 111 merely di-
rects the employer to adopt a smoking policy. All of the specifics are left to the
discretion of each individual employer.
58. See United Telephone Co. of Florida, 78 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 865 (designa-
tion of no-smoking table in cafeteria upheld as reasonable in light of company
and union's interests in maintaining a healthy work environment and minimizing
expenses and potential liability); H-N Advertising & Display Co., 88 Lab.Arb.
(BNA) 329, 88 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 1311 (rule banning smoking in area of plant where
combustibles are stored was reasonable and nondiscriminatory where worker
safety was primary reason for expanding rule and implementation of measures to
improve safety is normally management prerogative). See also supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
59. 79 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 193 (1982) (Koven, Arb.).
60. Id. at 196.
61. Id. at 195.
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a day they were not in their offices but were out in the field; and
no one complained about the smoking.2 Moreover, the California
Indoor Clean Air Act,63 which the employer cited to justify its ban,
did not require a ban on smoking." Rather, that Act contemplates
a relatively flexible regulation of smoking which recognizes the
"rights" of both smokers and nonsmokers.6
3. Discrimination Claims
There is also a possibility that employers' policies or practices
limiting smoking in the workplace may trigger "disparate impact"
discrimination claims.6 Because a greater percentage of blacks in
the United States smoke than whites, outright hiring bans or other
policies which unduly restrict smoking in the workplace may dis-
proportionately affect black employees.6 Thus, employer smoking
62. Id. at 194.
63. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25940, 25947 (West 1984).
64. Id. at 196.
65. See also Schien Body & Equip. Corp. 69 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 930 (1977)
(Roberts, Arb.) (employer plant-wide smoking ban unreasonable since there was
no proof that the rule clearly benefitted nonsmokers, since work area was well
ventilated, nor was there any indication that the ban directly improved workers'
health). But cf. Ohio Dept. of Health 89 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 937 (1987) (Cohen, Arb.)
(state's modified smoking policy for health department employees found reasona-
bly related to legitimate objectives); Morelite Equipment Co. 88 Lab.Arb. (BNA)
777 (1987) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (smoking ban at workstations reasonable in view of
fire dangers); Litton Industries 75 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 308 (1980) (Grabb, Arb.) (rule
limiting smoking to specific areas reasonable).
66. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,-17 (1982) prohibits em-
ployer policies which, while facially neutral, "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971). In other words, Title VII prohibits otherwise neutral employment
practices which disproportionately affect protected groups.
Employer smoking restrictions may also be challenged under Title VII if indi-
viduals are subjected to "disparate treatment" because of their race, sex, religion,
or national origin. In such cases, the plaintiffs must prove that the employer in-
tended to treat them differently on account of their protected status. See McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But see Moore v. Inmont Corp.,
608 F. Supp. 919 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (Title VII claim rejected where black employee
discharged for violating smoking policy applied equally to all employees).
67. The results of smoking prevalence studies vary depending on the year
and sample size. However, the studies uniformly report a greater incidence of
smoking among blacks. For example, in 1980, 47.7% of black males smoked, com-
pared with 40.2% of white males. See Report of the Surgeon General, The Health
Consequences of Smoking/Cancer and Chronic Lung Disease in the Workplace,
at 49 (1985).
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policies disproportionately affecting blacks might be challenged
under state or federal discrimination laws.6 8 Once an employee
shows that an employer's otherwise neutral smoking policy or prac-
tice has a statistically significant disproportionate impact on
blacks, the employee has made out a prima facie case of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.69 In order to defend, the employer must then
successfully demonstrate that the policy or practice is justified by a
"business necessity." 0 Some smoking restrictions, such as those
prohibiting smoking near hazardous or flammable materials, may
constitute a "business necessity." Unless required by statute or or-
dinance, however, it is unlikely that courts would find that the
preferences of co-employees or customers rise to the level of busi-
ness necessity. "1 Even so, the court could still find a Title VII vio-
A 1986 study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control found that black
men smoked at a rate of 32.5% while white men smoked at a rate of 29.3%. The
prevalence of smoking was only slightly higher among black women (25.1%) than
white women (23.7%). See "Cigarette Smoking in the United States, 1986," Mor-
bity and Mortality Weekly Report, vol. 36, no. 35 (Sept. 11, 1987), distributed by
the Massachusetts Medical Society.
A 1985 National Health Interview survey conducted by the National Center
for Health Statistics also found greater incidence of smoking among blacks. See
Vital Health Statistics, Health Promotion and Disease Prevention United
States, 1985, published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
DHHS Publication No. (PHS) 88-1591 (February 1988) at 70.
For a collection of the results of numerous nationwide studies concerning the
prevalence of smoking among blacks and whites, see attachment 1 to article by R.
Ethridge and J. Fox, "Toward a Civil Rights Approach to Smoking," Currents
(1987), published by the American Association for Affirmative Action.
68. For a comprehensive discussion of smoking and civil rights issues, see
Ethridge and Fox, "Toward a Civil Rights Approach to Smoking," Currents
(1987), published by the American Association for Affirmative Action.
. 69. A prima facie case is sufficient to prove a Title VII violation, unless con-
tradicted or overcome by other evidence. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
70. To prove a business necessity, an employer may show that the challenged
policy or practice- has a "manifest relationship" to performance of the job in ques-
tion (i.e., that it is a "job-related criterion"). Alternatively, the employer may seek
to prove that the policy or practice in question is necessary to the safe and effi-
cient operation of the business. "[A] discriminatory employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII
challenge." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332, n. 14 (1977).
71. See Rucker v. Higher Educational Aids Board, 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th
Cir. 1982) (employer is forbidden by Title VII to refuse to hire someone on racial
grounds because his customers or clientele do not like his race); Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
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lation if the employee proves that there are other alternatives
which accomplish the same business purpose, yet have less impact
on blacks.72
Accordingly, employers need to examine carefully current or
proposed workplace smoking restrictions to ensure that they do
not discriminate against protected groups. If they do, the employer
must be prepared to establish that the smoking policy adopted is
justified by legitimate business purposes and is the least drastic
means of accomplishing the employer's goals.
C. Common Law Claims
Employees have filed several lawsuits claiming that workplace
smoking violates an employer's general common law duty to pro-
vide a reasonably safe working environment for its employees."
However, only one lower court decision in New Jersey, Shimp v.
New Jersey Bell Telephone74 has found an employer permitting
smoking in the workplace to have violated this duty.
In Shimp, a secretary who claimed to suffer from a severe "al-
lergic" reaction to tobacco smoke sought an injunction to prevent
other employees from smoking in her work area.75 Plaintiff submit-
ted medical opinions in support of her request for an injunciion.1e
(1971) (Pan Am violated Title VII when it banned employment of male flight
attendants despite passenger preferences for female flight attendants); Bing v.
Roadway Enterprises, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971) (invalidating a motor
freight company's rule that an employee who desired to transfer to another job
must resign his present position and thereby forfeit accrued employment rights.
Finding the rule to have an adverse impact on blacks, the court rejected the com-
pany's argument that the rule was "necessitated" by the prospect of employee
unhappiness with the demise of the rule). Accord Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
72. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). If an employer meets the
burden of showing that its tests or selection devices are job-related, the burden
then shifts to the complaining party to show that other less discriminatory selec-
tion devices would also serve the employer's legitimate interests. See also Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
73. This duty has been codified by federal and state occupational safety and
health (OSHA) laws. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (Federal OSHA). Section 654(a)
sets forth the so-called "general duty" clause, which requires that an employer
"shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees." See also supra note 40.
74. 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id. at 410-15.
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The employer, on the other hand, failed to put forth any evidence
to refute the plaintiff's claims." Not surprisingly, the New Jersey
Superior Court found that the employer had a common law duty to
provide safe working conditions. Accordingly, it directed the em-
ployer to restrict smoking to the lunchroom.7 8
A key determinant of the outcome of Shimp was a lack of any
active defense by New Jersey Bell, which filed no answer or affida-
vits in opposition to plaintiffs request for an injunction.79 It is
quite possible that the result in Shimp might have been different
had it been contested and had New Jersey Bell, instead, aggres-
sively defended itself. Significantly, an identical complaint subse-
quently filed by Ms. Shimp's attorney before the same judge on
behalf of another New Jersey Bell employee was summarily dis-
missed.80 The only difference between the two cases is that the em-
ployer elected to defend itself in the later case.
Seven years later in Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,81 the
New Jersey Superior Court rejected and dismissed a similar claim
by a nonsmoking employee who also claimed to be hypersensitive
to environmental tobacco smoke.82 The Smith Court held that the
safety of the workplace was to be judged by reference to the "typi-
cal" employee, not the "supersensitive" employee.83 Moreover, the
court limited the holding in Shimp, stating:
Insofar as the Shimp case is read by some as requiring an
employer to institute Draconian measures to smoking employees I
think it has to be viewed somewhat skeptically and cautiously. I
myself have no problem at all with the basic concept of Shimp,
that a safe workplace is required, but I must say it seems to me
that some of the prohibitions contained in the Shimp case are too
77. Id.
78. Id. at 416.
79. Id.
80. Mitchell v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., No. C-4159-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div.)
81. No. C-3617-81E (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1983).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 15 ("It simply is not right in terms of the way in which human
beings have to relate to one another, that because someone is as sensitive as that
all the rest of the world has to go through a tightly-controlled regimen of smoking
discipline"). Id. at 13 ("[Smokers] are after all human beings with needs and feel-
ings like everyone else, and there simply is no warrant and nojustification as a
matter of civilized management of a work force to treat smokers as though they
were moral lepers and to banish them to a remote isolated area of the workplace
. .. •").
1989]
17
Fox: Smoking in the Workplace: Who Has What Rights?
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1989
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
sweeping and go well beyond what is necessary to ensure a safe
working place."
The Smith Court therefore concluded that the nonsmoking "super-
sensitive" employee had no right to a smoke-free environment.8 5
A District of Columbia court reached the same conclusion in
Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research, Inc."6 In Gordon, an em-
ployer terminated an employee after she refused to work in an area
containing some tobacco smoke." The employee subsequently filed
a lawsuit contending that the employer was negligent in not pro-
viding her with a smoke-free workplace.8 8 The Gordon Court dis-
missed the employee's claim because the plaintiff had presented no
evidence to support her allegations that tobacco smoke was harm-
ful to employees. 9 Significantly, the court in Gordon held that the
employer had no duty to conform the workplace to the particular
needs or sensitivities of an individual employee.9 0
Likewise, the trial court in Smith v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc.9 1 also rejected an employee's claim that the employer
breached its common law duty to maintain a safe working environ-
ment. 92 This conclusion was based on the court's finding that "the
tobacco smoke in plaintiff's former work area was [not] hazardous
to the health of plaintiff or the health of the other employees in
that area."9 The court added that the employer was not required
to provide a "comfortable" workplace.9 4
While there is thus far only a single court decision which
might support the allegation that employers have a common law
duty to restrict environmental tobacco smoke in the workplace,
employers must nevertheless be careful not to retaliate against em-
ployees who protest corporate policies permitting smoking. In
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 16-17.
86. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983).
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 15.
91. No. 4446121 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct. April 23, 1985). This case was on
remand from an earlier decision, Smith v. Western Electric Company, 643 S.W.2d
10 (Mo. App. 1982), which recognized that employers have a common law duty to
provide a safe workplace.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 4.
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Hentzel v. Singer Co.,95 a California court held that an employee
could state a common law retaliatory dismissal claim after being
terminated for protesting existing working conditions.9" The court
did so without addressing whether the environmental tobacco
smoke was, in fact, hazardous.9 7
Overall, courts have been reluctant to find any common law
basis for restricting workplace smoking in the absence of sufficient
proof that environmental tobacco smoke causes significant medical
harm to nonsmokers.98 With the exception of the now dated and
criticized 1976 Shimp decision,99 the courts have declined to ex-
pand an employer's common law duty to provide a safe working
environment to encompass a smoke-free working environment.00
95. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
96. Id. at 300, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
97. With the recent enactment of Proposition 65, California employers may
now have to provide warnings in areas where employees or visitors may be ex-
posed to environmental tobacco smoke. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.6
(West 1986).
98. In fact, no causal link has been scientifically established between ETS
and chronic adverse health effects. Both the Surgeon General and the National
Academy of Sciences reported that available studies preclude any firm conclusion
about the relationship between exposure to ETS and cardiovascular disease and
that further studies are needed to determine whether any real link exists. See,
e.g., Surgeon General's Report, supra note 3, at 14; NAS Report, supra note 3, at
11. In addition, the Surgeon General's report concluded that "a previously
healthy individual would not develop chronic lung disease solely on the basis of
involuntary tobacco smoke exposure in adult life." Surgeon General's Report,
supra note 3, at 62. Finally, both the Surgeon General and the National Academy
of Sciences reports emphasize critical limitations on their claim of a possible con-
nection between exposure to ETS and lung cancer. Upon reviewing the same evi-
dence considered by the NAS and the Surgeon General, the International Agency
for Research on Cancer of the World Health Organization concluded, also in late
1986, that the available evidence is equally consistent with the finding of an in-
crease in risk or an absence of risk. IARC Monograph, supra note 3, at 308. A
number of other studies published since 1986 also contradict conclusions of the
Surgeon General and NAS reports with respect to the purported relationship be-
tween ETS and lung cancer. See, e.g., Proceedings, supra note 3, at 242-50, 252-
58.
99. 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976).
100. In 1986, a Massachusetts court rejected a nonsmoker's claim against her
employer based on breach of contract, and intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Bernard v. Cameron and Colby Co. Inc., 397 Mass. 320, 419
N.E.2d 604 (1986). But, in McCarthy v. State of Washington, 110 Wash. 2d 812,
759 P.2d 351 (1988), the Washington Supreme Court recently held that an em-
ployee who allegedly developed lung disease as a result of exposure to tobacco
smoke in the workplace was not preempted by workers' compensation laws from
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Indeed, several courts which have addressed the issue to date have
recognized the need to consider the interests of both smokers and
nonsmokers.101
In sum, nonsmoking employees have not generally been ac-
corded any legal "right" to a smokefree work environment by the
courts. The only limited exception applies to alleged hypersensitive
employees who may be perceived as "handicapped." Nor have
courts accorded smokers a legal "right"-to smoke. With the excep-
tion of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
smokers as well as nonsmokers, are unlikely to convince the courts
to intervene in this area.
III. MOST EMPLOYEES HAVE No LEGISLATIVE "RIGHTS"
REGARDING WORKPLACE SMOKING
The issue of employee "rights" vis-a-vis smoking in the work
place demands a review of relevant state and local legislation. 2
Approximately thirteen states to date have enacted legislation spe-
cifically regulating smoking in private work places. 0 3 These are: (1)
stating a cause of action against her former employer for negligence. In a state-
ment issued by the Washington State Attorney General's office, a spokesperson
for the attorney general said that the dicta of the three justices in McCarthy did
not establish binding law on the issue of an employer's duty to provide a "reason-
ably safe" workplace. 26 Governmental Employment Relations Report,, 1172
(Aug. 1988). While three justices opined in dicta that employers have a common
law duty to provide a smoke-free work environment, that conclusion was specifi-
cally rejected by a majority of the court. Id. at 826. A trial on the merits in Mc-
Carthy is scheduled for October 1989.
101. See Shimp, 368 A.2d, at 416; Gordon, 462 A.2d at 14; McCarthy, 110
Wash. 2d, at 821-822.
102. There is no federal legislation regulating smoking in private work places.
However, the United States Government has adopted smoking restrictions cover-
ing the 6,800 buildings controlled by the General Services Administration. These
restrictions apply to approximately 890,000 federal employees. See 41 C.F.R. Part
101-20.105-3. See also "Federal Smoking Curb Stirs Groans and Cheers," New
York Times, February 7, 1987, sec. 1, at 30, col. 1.
In addition, the Federal Labor Relations Authority has recently restricted the
ability of several federal agencies to change smoking policy without first negotiat-
ing with bargaining units. Treasury Employees Union Chapter 250, et al., 33
FLRA No.8, pp. 61-74 (Before Calhoun and McKee) (October 13, 1988), Nos. 0-
NG-1524, 0-NG-1536 and O-NG-1545.
103. This figure represents only those states with laws specifically aimed at
private-sector workplaces. It does not include the various laws regulating smoking
by public sector employees in government-owned buildings or those public safety
or occupational regulations pertaining to smoking.
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Connecticut;' (2) Florida;' 05 (3) Iowa; 10 (4) Maine; 107 (5) Minne-
sota; 08 (6) Montana;109 (7) Nebraska;" 0 (8) New Hampshire; (9)
New Jersey;' 2 (10) Rhode Island;" 3 (11) Utah;" 4 (12) Vermont;" 5
and (13) Washington." 6
These state laws vary greatly, especially in the degree to which
they attempt to displace the role of the employer and its employ-
ees in resolving workplace smoking issues. However, virtually all of
the state laws have the following common features: (1) None of the
state laws entirely bans smoking in the workplace; 1 7 (2) Most state
laws do not prohibit smoking in specific areas; (3) Most provide
exceptions for enclosed private offices; and (4) Most provide for
only minor penalties, such as minimal fines, for violations.
Local city, county, or other municipal ordinances may also re-
strict smoking in private workplaces." 8 Local ordinances are often
more restrictive and specific than state statutes." 9 Local ordi-
nances may specifically limit smoking in particular areas of the
workplace. Some of these local laws, such as the San Francisco or-
dinance, also accord preferential treatment to nonsmoking employ-
ees within their work area. Overall, limited "rights" concerning
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 31-40q, (West 1986) (effective April 1, 1988).
105. FLA. STAT. ANN., §§ 386.201-.208 (West 1986) (effective October 1, 1985).
106. IOWA CODE ANN., §§ 98A.1-6, (West, 1988) (effective July 1, 1987).
107. ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 1580-A, (West Supp., 1988) (effective Jan-
uary 1, 1986).
108. MINN. STAT. ANN., §§ 144.411-.417, (West, 1989) (effective April 2, 1976).
109. MONT. CODE ANN., §§ 50-40-101 - 109, (1979).
110. NEB. REV. STAT., §§ 71-5701 - 5713, (1981).
111. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 115:50 - :53 (Supp. 1988) (effective January 1,
1987).
112. N.J. STAT. ANN., §§ 26:3D-23 - 31, (West, 1987) (effective March 1, 1986).
113. R.I. GEN. LAWS, tit. 23, §§ 23-20.7-1 - 7, (Supp. 1988) (effective June 27,
1986).
114. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 §§ 76-10-101, 76-10-106, 76-10-108 - 110, (1978)
(effective April 27, 1986).
115. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 1421 - 1428, (Supp. 1988) (effective July 1,
1988).
116. WASH. REV. CODE ANN., tit. 70, §§ 94.010-.910 (West, 1975) (effective
May 10, 1985).
117. In a recent election in Oregon, Proposition 6, which would have imposed
a virtual ban on smoking in all public places, including places of work, was de-
feated by a 3 to 2 margin.
118. Hundreds of local ordinances impact smoking in the workplace. The ma-
jority of these are located in California. BNA, Special, Report, at 66.
119. In Florida and Oklahoma, the state law preempts all local smoking
ordinances.
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work place smoking have been accorded to employees only in cer-
tain states and localities.
In contrast to legislation aimed at restricting workplace smok-
ing, smokers in several states may soon be protected by legislation
aimed at preserving their "right" to smoke on the job. For exam-
ple, the Virginia Senate recently passed a measure which provides
that "[a] private employer shall have sole authority for designating
smoking and nonsmoking areas within the private workplace un-
less the designation of such places is the subject of a written agree-
ment between the employer and employees."' 20 A companion mea-
sure would bar most government employers from requiring that
employees be nonsmokers as a condition of employment. 2'
While a similar bill prohibiting employment discrimination
against smokers was recently defeated in Maryland,' 22 other
"smokers' rights" bills have been introduced in Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Illinois, and Missouri.'23 These proposed laws all seek to pro-
tect the employment "rights" of smokers. For example, the Mis-
souri bill would make it unlawful for an employer "[t]o fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because the individ-
ual is a smoker or a nonsmoker . "... 1 24 Interestingly, a bill has
also been introduced in the Oregon Legislature which, if passed,
would prohibit employers from testing employees or prospective
employees to determine whether they smoke. 2 5 As the foregoing
illustrates, this recent surge of activity apparently evidences a leg-
islative trend towards protecting the "rights" of smokers and their
employment.
120. Virginia Senate Bill No. 601, offered January 20, 1989. See also "Senate
Approves Deadline For Antismoking Legislation," The Washington Post (Febru-
ary 3, 1989) sec. C, at 8, col. 1.
121. Virginia Senate Bill No. 607, offered January 20, 1989. See also "Senate
Approves Deadline for Antismoking Legislation," supra note 120.
122. Maryland S. Res. 729 (1989).
123. Arkansas: H.R. Res. 1901 (1989);
Delaware: S. Res. 95 and 67 (1989);
Illinois: H.R. Res. 0378 (1989); and
Missouri: S. Res. 440 (1989).
124. See H.R. Res. 440(c).
125. See H.R. Res. 2487 (1989).
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IV. MOST EMPLOYEES HAVE No OTHER LEGAL "RIGHTS"
REGARDING WORKPLACE SMOKING
Frustrated by this relatively insignificant success in the judi-
cial and legislative areas, some nonsmoking employees have re-
cently turned to the executive branch of government in an effort to
restrict workplace smoking. For example, in 1987, after twelve
years of legislative inaction, Governor Cuomo of New York
promulgated state-wide restrictions on work place smoking. The
New York Court of Appeals subsequently struck down the restric-
tions as an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power. 26
Aside from New York, most executive-type restrictions have
thus far been imposed on public sector employees working in state
or local office buildings. For instance, the governors of California,
Kansas, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington have enacted
executive orders which restrict smoking to some extent within ar-
eas occupied by state agencies, departments, or other facilities. 2
In addition, several mayors have imposed smoking limitations in
city facilities. 12 As with legislation, the various executive restric-
tions on workplace smoking differ substantially. None of the exec-
utive restrictions bans smoking entirely, while some expressly seek
to respect the interests of smokers.1 29
While similar executive-inspired restrictions on workplace
smoking may be imposed in the future, it is unlikely that they can
effectively displace the employers' important role in resolving
smoking issues. As with legislation, across-the-board executive pro-
nouncements cannot address the unique characteristics and needs
of each workplace.
126. Boreali v. Axelrod, 523 N.Y.2d 464, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350 (Ct.
App 1987). See also "Again New York Tries to Quit Smoking," The New York
Times (December 27, 1987) sec. E, at 6, col. 1.
127. California: Executive Order No. D-62-87, issued March 2, 1987 by Gov-
ernor Deukmejian; Kansas: Executive Order No. 87-99, issued July 1, 1987 by
Governor Hayden; Maryland- Executive Order No. 01.01.1987.13, issued May 6,
1987 by Governor Schaefer; Pennsylvania: Management Directive No. 205.19, is-
sued February 17, 1989 by Governor Casey; Washington: Executive Order No.
EO-88-06, issued August 29, 1988 by Governor Gardner.
128. Current or former mayors of Denver Colorado; Albany, New York, and
New York, New York have each issued directives concerning workplace smoking.
129. See Maryland Executive Order No. 01.01.1987.13, § 1; Pennsylvania
Management Directive No. 205.19, § 4.
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V. How SHOULD EMPLOYERS RESPOND TO THE WORKPLACE
SMOKING ISSUE?
Naturally, each employer's reaction to the workplace smoking
issue will vary depending on the needs and circumstances of its
work place. It is important in any situation to encourage a spirit of
cooperation and communication among employees and manage-
ment. Indeed, a recent survey of 1,100 employers indicated that
over seventy percent expect employees to first address smoking in
the work place issues among themselves before invoking manage-
ment's time and efforts. 130 Employers should also consider the fol-
lowing specific issues:
1. Is there an open line of communication so that employees
can effectively express their concerns and thereby informally re-
solve smoking-related disputes?
2. Have employees complained about co-workers' smoking or
tobacco smoke in the work environment?
3. If employees have complained, how many have done so,
and on what basis? Are such complaints properly attributable to
employee rivalries or individual sensitivities?
4. Is poor ventilation the cause of actual or perceived indoor
air quality problems?
5. Would the imposition of smoking restrictions in the work
place decrease productivity, adversely affect employee morale, vi-
olate the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement or give
rise to discrimination claims?
6. Could smoking disputes be resolved by management
through less drastic means, such as separating smokers from non-
smokers, erecting partitions or improving the company's ventila-
tion system?"'
130. The survey, entitled Smoking Policies in Large Corporations (hereinaf-
ter "Smoking Policies") and completed in May of 1985, was conducted by the
Human Resources Policy Corporation in Los Angeles, California. See also BNA,
Special Report at 26 (seventy-two percent of surveyed employers urged employ-
ees to resolve smoking-related problems themselves).
Other employer responses to complaints of work place smoking included: (1)
attempt to get smoker to reduce smoking (22.5 percent); (2) do nothing (9.7 per-
cent); (3) move complainer to new work area (6.3 percent); (4) move smoker to
new work area (3.4 percent); (5) other measures (3.1 percent); and (6) order
smoker to discontinue smoking (0.9 percent). Smoking Policies, Table 13, at 12.
See also BNA, Special Report at 26.
131. There is substantial evidence that suggests air quality complaints are
indicative of a much larger problem, i.e., inadequate ventilation. For example, a
January, 1987, report prepared by the National Institute for Occupational Safety
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After evaluating the work environment based on the foregoing
considerations, and addressing the likely accommodation options,
an employer should decide whether it is necessary to implement a
formal smoking policy."'2
VI. DRAFTING A SMOKING POLICY
In jurisdictions where workplace smoking is governed by a
state statute or local ordinance, employers must conform their pol-
icies and practices with the law. In some circumstances, this may
require employers to adopt a formal smoking policy., However, in
the vast majority of jurisdictions, employers are still free to decide
whether a smoking policy is necessary or appropriate. In doing so,
employers may want to evaluate whether there is a predicate for
action. In this regard, they may find it useful to survey their em-
ployees to see if there is a consensus of opinion. Management may
also want to consult its labor unions, if any, to avoid possible un-
fair labor practices.
Should a company decide that a formal written policy is neces-
sary, the specifics of the policy will naturally depend upon the in-
dividual aspects of the workplace. Because of local differences, par-
ticularly in those companies with decentralized decision making,
some companies have developed a smoking policy applicable to
only some divisions, offices, or plants. Other employers have
adopted a smoking policy in response to a specific problem or
where they are governed by a particular local ordinance. In addi-
and Health (NIOSH) attributed fifty-two percent of complaints connected to in-
door air quality to "inadequate ventilation." Only seventeen percent of the com-
plaints were attributable to indoor contaminants, including tobacco smoke (which
accounted for only two percent). In addition, chemicals emitted from carpeting,
furniture, and copying machines also contribute to indoor air contamination.
BNA, Special Report at 9-10. Similarly, according to a report entitled "Source
Nature and Symptomology of Indoor Air Pollutants" prepared by ACVA, At-
lanta, Inc., a Fairfax, Virginia company specializing in the study and assessment
of indoor air pollution [hereinafter ACVA Study], environmental tobacco smoke
was associated with indoor air problems in only four percent of the 233 major
buildings investigated between 1981 and 1987. ACVA Study at 9-11.
132. A majority (63.8 percent) of the 1,100 corporations who responded to
the Smoking Policies survey had not adopted any formal smoking policy. The
survey also revealed that the companies most likely to have smoking policies are
geographically located in areas with workplace smoking laws. Smoking Policies, at
4. More recently, a smaller BNA survey of 623 employers indicates that a minor-
ity (forty-six percent) of employers have not adopted any workplace smoking pol-
icy. BNA, Special Report at 2.
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tion, companies tend to vary their smoking policies depending
upon the degree of specificity desired. A less specific smoking pol-
icy aimed at promoting cooperation and consideration might, for
example, state that:
It is our policy to make every reasonable effort to accommodate
all employees within the constraints imposed by our physical
structure and financial resources. It is our firm conviction that
the wishes of smokers and nonsmokers can best be resolved
through cooperation, dialogue and common courtesy. Should a
dispute or concern arise, management and employees should work
together to seek a reasonable resolution consistent with this
policy.13s
A non-specific policy such as this will increase flexibility and allow
management to resolve individual disputes on a case-by-case basis.
In contrast, some employers may opt for a smoking policy with
a greater degree of specificity. For instance, the employer may
want to designate particular smoking or nonsmoking areas or
workstations. The specific locations covered may include: private
offices, hallways, conference rooms, lunch rooms, restrooms and au-
ditoriums. However, such policies, as with any personnel policy,
place the employer in an enforcement role, protecting the sanctity
of and enforcing its rules. 134
Smoking bans, while rare, pose more serious problems. 13 5 This
133. Smoking policy drafted by the Author.
134. If enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, a smoking policy
may subject an employer to potential liability. Indeed, inequitable enforcement
could foster employee discontent and possibly support claims premised on breach
of contract or tort claims against employers or individual supervisors. See Carroll
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 697 F. Supp. 508 (D.D.C. 1988) (public employer
not shielded from potential tort liability under "official immunity" doctrine, since
supervisor who failed to enforce smoking policy acted outside course and scope of
his employment).
In Carroll, the plaintiff claimed that she had developed lung disease allegedly
from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke on the job. Id. at 509. In addition,
she alleged that her supervisors took reprisals against her by giving her poor per-
formance evaluations, assigning her demeaning work, and questioning the serious-
ness of her health claims. Id. On November 1, 1988, this case was settled for an
undisclosed sum of money.
135. The vast majority of employers with smoking policies do not ban smok-
ing entirely. As noted above, those which do typically do so due to prevent (food)
contamination concerns or because flammable materials are produced or stored in
the workplace. And few (five percent) give hiring preference to nonsmoking job
applicants. BNA, Special Report, at 17, 22. One notable exception pertains to
police and fire departments, which are faced with unique workers' compensation
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is especially true if they proscribe off-duty behavior. In addition to
employee morale problems, these bans are likely to give rise to a
morass of legal claims.' For these reasons, employers should be
extremely cautious before considering a total ban on workplace
smoking.
VII. CONCLUSION
Smoking can be the subject of emotional debate in the work-
place. Neither the judicial, legislative, nor the executive branch of
government is appropriate for resolving the competing interests of
smokers and nonsmokers. Instead, most employers generally find
that they can resolve smoking disputes by undertaking practical
accommodations on a case-by-case basis. Some specific options for
resolving smoking disputes include: First, separating smokers from
nonsmokers; second, moving nonsmokers closer to windows or
fresh air ducts; and third, improving ventilation throughout the
workplace. However difficult and legally complex the smoking in
the workplace issue has become, one thing is clear: employers have
an obligation to accommodate the competing interests of smoking
and nonsmoking employees. It is equally clear that in an era of
increasing labor shortages, employers are redoubling their efforts
to select and retain skilled and experienced workers-smokers as
well as nonsmokers.
issues. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. See also "Bans, Red Ink:
Smoking: A Burning Work Issue," supra (Pacific Northwest Bell bans smoking in
all facilities; Radar Electric of Seattle will not hire smokers; Capital City Products
conducts seminars to help employees quit smoking).
136. For a thorough discussion of smoking bans, see Refusing to Employ
Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 940
(1987).
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